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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY  
Informal employment is defined by the International Labour Organization as “economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are in law or in practice not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements”. In research, individuals who work without 
a written contract are usually considered to be informal workers. 
Informal work has become a recognised problem in both developing and developed 
countries. This is because informal workers are not covered by the law, may lack access to 
unemployment insurance, pensions, or the health system, and are less productive. This is 
not only unfair to the individual worker, but it is also detrimental to the economy as a 
whole, as informal workers do not pay taxes. As a result, reducing informal work is a 
recognised policy objective. 
During the last few decades and especially after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
several European countries implemented employment reforms involving cuts to labour 
protection to increase labour market flexibility and reduce unemployment. While some 
authors argue that these measures worked in reducing unemployment rates, we posit that 
one of their ‘side effects’ was the rise in the prevalence of informal work. 
Testing this is the goal of this paper. To do so, we analysed whether or not different 
indicators of labour protection were associated with the prevalence of informal 
employment in 20 European countries during the time period comprised between 2004 
and 2012, i.e. before, during and after the GFC. 
Key results indicate that increases in labour protection are associated with reductions in 
the prevalence of informal work. This finding has significant policy implications, and 
suggests that policies promoting labour market flexibility through reducing the generosity 
of unemployment benefit schemes and the regulation of employment protection can have 
the unintended consequence of increasing the size of the informal sector. This may offset 
(or partially offset) the benefits associated with labour market flexibility. 
These findings can thus inform and contextualise current political and media debates 
about the pros and cons of implementing employment protection legislation in times of 
economic recession.  
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Abstract 
Informal work, defined as work that is undertaken without a formal contract, lowers 
productivity, reduces government tax revenue and hampers economic growth. Thus, reducing 
informal work is a recognised policy objective in developed and developing countries. Social 
and economic policy in Europe shifted markedly in recent years, particularly after the 
emergence of the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. Most reforms involved decreasing the 
generosity of unemployment benefit schemes and reducing the regulation of employment 
protection. We argue that, while these reforms may have contributed to reducing 
unemployment, they might also have had negative consequences, such as the increase of 
informal work. To test this, we use cross-national European Social Survey data for 2004-2012 
augmented with external macro-level variables, and pooled and pseudo-panel regression 
models. Key findings indicate that labour protection is effective in reducing the prevalence of 
informal work amongst employees. 
 
Keywords: labour protection; social security programs; informal employment; pseudo-panel 
estimation; cross-national analysis; Global Financial Crisis 
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1. Introduction and background 
Informal employment, defined by the International Labour Organization as “economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are in law or in practice not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” (2002, p.53) is a recognised problem in both 
developing and developed countries. Informal workers are not covered by the law and lack 
access to unemployment insurance, pensions, or the health system. Informal workers are also 
less productive (Bernal 2009, Henley et al. 2009), which hampers economic growth, and do 
not pay taxes, which reduces government revenue and its subsequent ability to protect 
workers. As a result, reducing informal work has been a recognised policy objective in 
developed and developing countries for several decades.  
During the last few decades and especially after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
several European countries implemented employment reforms to increase labour market 
flexibility and reduce unemployment. Turrini et al. (2014) reviewed the breadth of policy 
reforms undertaken in European countries since the GFC, concluding that a majority of them 
involved decreasing labour protection. One way consisted of reducing the generosity of 
unemployment benefit schemes (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999a, 1999b; Cahuc 2014). This 
sort of reform has been more common in Eastern and Western Europe. Another way consisted 
of reducing the regulation of employment protection. These measures were most typically 
followed in countries with high unemployment rates, including Southern European countries 
such as Portugal or Italy. These courses of action are unsurprising given that labour protection 
restricts firing and hiring, increasing the costs incurred by employers to dismiss workers 
(Janiak and Wasmer 2014, Skedinger 2010). Altogether, there is evidence that these reforms 
did reduce unemployment and long-term unemployment rates (Martin 2014). However, by 
reducing labour protection, they might have had impacts on areas other than unemployment.  
Empirical evidence on the macro-level effects of labour protection is mixed. Some studies 
find that labour protection has negative consequences. These include adverse effects on 
disadvantaged groups of workers (e.g. young people), increases in the number of workers in 
temporary contracts, reduced productivity, and lengthening of unemployment spells (Bajada 
and Schneider 2009, Skedinger 2010). Other studies report benefits of labour protection. For 
example, Janiak and Wasmer (2014) find a positive effect on capital-labour ratios through 
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skill protection. Similarly, Boeri et al. (2013) argue that tenure-based severance payments 
increase productivity by increasing investments in training, reducing inefficient firing, and 
promoting efficient labour allocation. There is also a literature highlighting the role of labour 
protection in reducing the negative outcomes of economic recession on the most vulnerable, 
on aspects that include mental health, mortality and suicide (Zivin et al. 2011, Suhrcke and 
Stuckler 2012). 
Importantly, labour protection legislation can be used to protect workers against the decisions 
of employers, particularly in countries where employment law is sometimes not fully 
enforced (e.g. Southern European and Latin American countries): 
 
“[A]n employer who does not comply with health and safety regulations in the 
workplace may fire workers who complain. The employer may have an interest 
to do so if he has monopsony power which allows him to replace those workers 
at low cost. Enacting a regulation which protects workers against such layoffs 
may improve efficiency.”  (Cahuc 2014, p.12) 
 
There is however a paucity of research devoted to systematically examining the effects of 
recent labour market reforms pertaining to labour protection on rates of informal employment 
across Europe, despite the importance of the subject matter and the number and depth of such 
reforms. Two studies stand as exceptions. Hazans (2011a) examined how labour market 
institutions are associated with growth in informal employment in Europe between 2004 and 
2009. He finds that national rates of informal employment decrease with strict labour 
protection legislation and higher tax wedges on labour. Fialová (2010) examined the effect 
of labour institutions on the share of workers without a contract in Europe between 2003 and 
2007. Her findings indicate that such share increased with the strictness of labour protection 
legislation. It must be emphasised, however, that Fialova (2010) defines informal work to 
include workers with temporary legal contracts. 
Findings from these two prior studies are tentative, as they rely on aggregate country-level 
information. Additionally, they only relate to the period before the GFC, and so predate the 
more profound economic reforms that occurred in Europe thereafter. In this paper we 
contribute to the literature by analysing the impact of different indicators of labour protection 
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on the prevalence of informal employment in European countries between 2004 and 2012, 
using cross-national data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and pseudo-panel 
regression models. Key findings indicate that increases in labour protection are associated 
with reductions in the prevalence of informal work. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
We follow the theoretical model proposed by Flórez (2014). In this approach, time is 
continuous with 𝑡𝑡 ∈ [0,∞) and workers die at rate 𝜇𝜇 > 0, where 𝜇𝜇 also describes the inflow 
of new entrants in the labour market. For simplicity, all workers have the same subjective 
discount rate 𝜌𝜌 > 0. There are two sectors within the economy: the formal sector and the 
informal sector. In the formal sector, workers earn the exogenous wage 𝑤𝑤. In the informal 
sector, workers earn the exogenous wage 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼. 𝑤𝑤 depends on workers’ productive capacities 
whereas 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼 does not. We assume that 𝑤𝑤 is higher than 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼.1 While there are matching frictions 
in the formal sector, we assume that no such frictions exist in the informal sector. Following 
previous work in the field (see e.g. Maloney 1999, 2004; Albrecht et al. 2009), we also 
assume that the informal sector consists of unregulated self-employment. From this 
perspective, the decision to work in the informal sector is voluntary.2 
In our model a representative worker has asset 𝐴𝐴 ≥ 0 and can be in one of two states: 
unemployed (𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈) and employed in the formal sector (𝑠𝑠 = 𝐸𝐸). Given their state, at every 
point in time the worker chooses consumption 𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0 where 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) describes the utility flow 
of consumption. The utility flow of consumption 𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) is increasing, continuously 
differentiable and strictly concave with 𝑢𝑢(0) = 0. We also assume a perfect annuity market 
in which the worker enjoys the rate of return 𝑟𝑟 = 𝜌𝜌 + 𝜇𝜇 to savings and the worker’s assets 
revert to the bank on death. The liquidity constraint 𝐴𝐴 ≥ 0 implies that banks do not lend to 
those with no assets. 
                                                          
1 We do not consider cases when w < wI because, in this scenario, the decision to be an informal worker should 
not be affected by social security programs (Flórez 2014). 
2 Research in developing countries suggests that there is substantial heterogeneity within informal work, 
particularly between voluntary and involuntary informal employment (Fields 1990; Kucera and Roncolato 
2008; Perry et al. 2007; Pagés and Stampini 2009). The latter is argued to be the most prevalent and detrimental. 
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When unemployed, the worker has three possible options. One option is to be non-
participant, in which case he enjoys an additional utility flow 𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 > 0 but his/her only income 
stream is asset income 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴. A second option is to seek employment in the formal sector, in 
which case he enjoys an asset income 𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 plus a benefit flow 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 from the government. 
The jobseeker can also split his time between job search and employment in the informal 
sector and this split is unobserved by the government. For simplicity one of the following 
two possibilities is allowed: (i) searching full-time for employment and then receiving a 
formal job offer at rate λ (formal searchers), or (ii) taking casual employment which yields 
additional income 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼 in the informal sector and only receiving a formal job offer at rate φλ 
with φ < 1 (informal searchers). A formal job offer implies that the worker becomes 
employed at wage w. The worker can quit without cost from employment and so becomes 
unemployed. Switching from unemployment to employment, however, requires search. 
Employed workers face job destruction shocks, which occur according to an exogenous 
Poisson process with parameter 𝛿𝛿. The insurance program of the government is 𝐵𝐵 = {𝑏𝑏, 𝑆𝑆}, 
where 𝑏𝑏 represents the social security payment,3 and 𝑆𝑆 is the lump sum received by workers 
when laid off. 
The representative agent’s Hamilton/Jacobi/Bellman equation that describes the value of 
being unemployed with assets 𝐴𝐴 ≥ 0 is given by: 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐≥0 �𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 [𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 − 𝑐𝑐]� ,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐≥0 �𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 [𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼 − 𝑐𝑐] + 𝜑𝜑 λmax[𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴) − 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴), 0] � ,
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐≥0 �𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 [𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑐𝑐] +  λmax[𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴) − 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴), 0] � ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
 
 
When 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴) ≥ 𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴); i.e while it is (strictly) suboptimal to quit into unemployment, the 
                                                          
3 In this theoretical model, 𝑏𝑏 refers to social security payments rather than unemployment insurance. This is 
because governments cannot distinguish between individuals who (a) search for a formal job on a full-time 
basis and (b) search for a formal job on a part-time basis while working in the informal sector. Under these 
circumstances, social security payments provide a minimum level of resources during unemployment rather 
than insurance against lost earnings (Immervoll, 2012). 
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Hamilton/Jacobi/Bellman equation which describes the value of being employed with assets 
𝐴𝐴 ≥ 0 changes to: 
 
𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴) = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑐𝑐≥0 �𝑢𝑢(𝑐𝑐) + 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 [𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼 − 𝑐𝑐] + 𝛿𝛿max[𝑟𝑟𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴 + 𝑆𝑆) − 𝑟𝑟𝐸𝐸(𝐴𝐴), 0] � 
 
The last line in this equation describes the expected loss of receiving a ‘shock destruction’ 
with probability 𝛿𝛿. When a worker loses his/her job, the level of assets increases by the 
severance payment S. These two Hamilton/Jacobi/Bellman equations are solved numerically 
in Flórez (2014). The solution suggests that labour protection should improve search 
incentives through ‘entitlement effects’,4 protect workers from liquidity constrains, and 
ultimately reduce informal work. We test the last premise using suitable econometric 
methods described in the next section. 
 
3. Econometric model 
3.1 Pooled probit model 
Using the above theoretical framework we test whether individuals’ decisions to work in the 
formal or informal sector is affected by labour market policies including unemployment 
benefits, active labour policies and labour protection legislation. Such decision, conditional 
on current and future realizations of the exogenous variables, is given by: 
 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 0) = 1(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0)(𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁; 𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇)  (1) 
 
where the i and t subscripts stand for individual and time respectively. 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator 
function that is equal to 1 if the worker decides to be an informal worker and 0 otherwise, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
is a vector of observed variables capturing socio-demographic and work-related 
                                                          
4 Entitlement effects refer to the increase in unemployed workers’ search intensity when unemployment benefits 
are about to exhaust (Mortensen 1977, Fredrikson and Holmlund 2001, Coles and Masters 2004, 2007). 
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characteristics, as well as social security programs implemented by the national government, 
and 𝛽𝛽 is the corresponding vector of estimated model coefficients. 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represents 
the combined effect of unobserved factors affecting the decision to become a formal or 
informal worker, and can be split into two components: time-invariant person-specific 
unobserved heterogeneity, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖, and a standard stochastic error term, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
The above model can only be estimated in the presence of panel data, but only repeated cross-
sectional data are available. In this scenario, two approaches are possible: pooled models and 
pseudo-panel models. Our first and most simple approach is to estimate a multivariate 
(pooled) probit regression model. This is given by: 
 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 = 1(𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖∗ > 0) = 1(𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 > 0)(𝑖𝑖 = 1, …𝑁𝑁) (2) 
 
This assumes that 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is uncorrelated with the 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 variables for the model to provide consistent 
and efficient estimates of the βs. Note that because we have data from different countries, the 
model includes dummy variables capturing country fixed-effects. 
 
3.2 Pseudo-panel linear fixed-effect model 
If the assumption of orthogonality between 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 and 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 (a rather ‘heroic’ assumption) does not 
hold, then the pooled model gives inconsistent estimates of the βs. To relax this assumption, 
in the absence of suitable panel data we estimate pseudo-panel regression models (Deaton 
1985). Additionally, pseudo-panel estimation has other important advantages over cross-
sectional analysis: it enables combining data from multiple datasets into an integrated dataset, 
minimizes attrition bias, reduces bias due to individuals’ response errors, and it minimizes 
the problem of ‘ecological fallacy’ by using both macro-level and individual-level data 
(Deaton 1985). 
The pseudo-panel models take the form: 
 
𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐 = 1, …𝐶𝐶; 𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇) (3) 
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where 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the average of 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 across individuals who belong to cohort 𝑐𝑐 at time 𝑡𝑡, ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the 
average of 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 across individuals in cohort 𝑐𝑐 at time 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑢𝑢�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖=𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 denotes unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
If the number of individuals in each cohort is sufficiently large, then 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 can be treated as a 
fixed parameter, assuming that variation over time can be ignored (Deaton 1985): 
 
𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐 (4) 
 
Then, the pseudo-panel equation is given by:  
 
𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑐𝑐 = 1, …𝐶𝐶; 𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇) (5) 
 
where 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐 represents time-invariant unobserved effects and 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 is the standard stochastic error 
term in regression. The within transformation is then applied to equation (5) to estimate the 
pseudo-panel fixed-effect model: 
 
𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐 = (?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝛽 + (𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐 − 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐) + (𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐) (6) 
 
where 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐, ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐, 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐, 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐 denote over-time cohort averages. Since 𝑧𝑧?̅?𝑐 is by assumption time-
invariant, it is averaged out of the equation: 
 
𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐 = (?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑚𝑐𝑐)𝛽𝛽 + (𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐𝑖𝑖 − 𝜀𝜀?̅?𝑐) (7) 
 
Hence, under the assumptions posed above, the pseudo panel fixed-effect model eliminates 
the potentially biasing effects of time-constant unobserved heterogeneity, enabling more 
8 
 
robust estimation of the effect of labour protection on informal work. In our specific 
application, unobserved factors (such as unobserved skills and abilities, job preferences, 
personality traits and risk attitudes, or legal status of immigrants) might be correlated with 
both exposure to labour protection and informal work. It is for this reason that, unlike pooled 
cross-sectional models, pseudo-panel estimates will not suffer from omitted variable bias. 
Note that the cohort mean of the individual-level outcome variable, i.e. whether the 
respondent works informally, is no longer a dichotomous variable but a proportion. Hence, 
the pseudo-panel fixed-effect regressions are linear models. This means that their results are 
not strictly comparable to those from the pooled probit models. 
 
4. Data 
We use multiple waves of data from the European Social Survey (ESS), specifically the 
available 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 instalments. The ESS is a multi-purpose large-
scale repeated cross-sectional survey collected biannually through face-to-face interviews in 
over 30 European countries. Our interest is on temporal changes in informal employment, 
and so we restrict our analyses to countries for which the requisite information is available 
for at least 3 time points.5 These include the following 20 countries: Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, 
Hungary, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, 
and the United Kingdom. The total sample size in the analyses is circa 90,000 observations. 
The ESS contains information on whether employees are working without a contract, derived 
from a question that reads: “Do you have a formal contract of unlimited or limited 
duration?”. We use this to construct our outcome variable: a dummy variable indicating 
whether a worker works in the informal sector (value 1), or the formal sector (value 0). 
Hence, as in Hazans (2011b), informal employees are those who have no verbal or written 
contract, whereas formal workers are those who have a verbal or written contract, irrespective 
of whether this is of limited or unlimited duration. Following research by the ILO 
(Hussmanns 2004), individuals who are self-employed (and by default do not have a contract) 
                                                          
5 Croatia, Iceland, Latvia, Romania and Turkey were excluded from the analyses for this reason. 
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are catalogued as formal if they work in a professional occupations or employ more than five 
employees, and as informal workers otherwise. In the analyses, the subsamples of employees 
and self-employed workers are considered jointly as well as separately. 
Table 1 shows the share of workers employed in the informal sector, by country. On average, 
about 19% of workers were informal workers across our sample of 20 European countries in 
2004.6 By 2012, this figure had fallen to about 16%. However, most of that change occurred 
in the 2004-2006 period, with little decreases and sporadic increases thereafter. Rates of 
informal employment are highly volatile across European countries. Over the sample period, 
these are generally higher amongst Southern European countries and lower in Northern 
European countries. In 2010 (the most recent year for which data are available across all 
countries), the countries with the highest informality rates were Greece (46%), Ireland (39%), 
Portugal (23%), United Kingdom (20%) and Spain (19%), while the countries with the lowest 
rates were Norway (9%), Estonia, France and Germany (10%). Both the share of informal 
employees and the share of self-employed workers decreased over time. 
We augment the pooled ESS data by incorporating external measures of labour protection 
legislation by country and year. Following previous literature (Sapir 2006, Hazans 2011b, 
Fialová 2010) we use several different country-level measures of the intensity of social 
security programs derived from publicly-available OECD data. Social security programs 
provide financial support to low-income, disabled and unemployed individuals, and 
assistance to the unemployed to move into employment (Bajada and Schneider 2009). 
Reflecting this definition, empirical indicators of labour protection usually split the concept 
into two components: (i) protection of employed individuals and (ii) protection of 
unemployed individuals (Sapir 2006). 
 
 
Table 1: Informal work as a proportion of total employment by country 
 All workers  Employees  Self-employed workers 
 04 06 08 10 12  04 06 08 10 12  04 06 08 10 12 
                  
                                                          
6 Arguably, these figures are lower-bound estimates of the true levels of informal employment, as they do not 
take into account ‘envelope wages’, i.e. undeclared wages received by workers from their formal employers 
(Hazans 2011a). 
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Belgium 13 13 11 11 13  3 3 2 2 3  10 10 9 9 10 
Czech Republic 13 - 13 15 14  3 - 2 3 2  10 - 11 13 12 
Denmark 12 16 11 11 9  6 8 4 4 3  6 8 7 7 6 
Estonia 9 9 11 11 10  2 5 4 3 3  7 4 7 7 7 
Finland 11 11 11 13 12  1 1 1 1 2  11 10 10 12 10 
France - 10 11 10 -  - 4 3 2 -  - 6 8 8 - 
Germany 12 13 12 10 10  2 2 1 2 1  10 11 11 8 9 
Greece 53 - 52 46 -  25 - 23 16 -  28 - 29 30 - 
Hungary - 11 11 11 10  - 4 4 2 3  - 7 7 9 7 
Ireland 43 41 39 39 36  29 27 22 23 20  14 14 16 16 16 
Netherland 13 12 12 12 13  5 5 3 3 2  8 7 9 9 10 
Norway 16 15 12 9 9  6 6 5 3 3  10 9 7 6 6 
Poland 24 19 22 17 20  5 5 5 3 4  19 14 17 14 16 
Portugal 20 23 24 23 25  4 9 9 8 10  16 14 15 15 15 
Slovakia 14 13 12 14 15  3 2 1 1 3  11 11 11 13 12 
Slovenia 13 12 15 11 13  6 5 7 3 2  7 7 8 8 11 
Spain 19 21 20 19 19  5 6 5 3 5  14 15 15 16 14 
Sweden 9 8 8 11 10  8 7 7 10 8  1 1 1 1 2 
Switzerland 13 16 13 12 10  2 3 3 2 2  11 13 11 10 8 
United Kingdom 24 22 22 20 21  13 12 11 9 8  11 10 11 11 13 
All countries 19 16 17 15 15  7 5 5 4 4  12 11 12 11 11 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012).  
 
We measure labour protection of employed individuals using the Employment Protection 
Legislation and Collective dismissal index (EPRC) devised by the OECD, which captures 
the degree to which regular workers are protected against individual and collective dismissal. 
This index incorporates different dimensions: notification, severance payments, and 
additional cost for collective dismissals, and can range from 0 (lowest protection) to 6 
(highest protection) (see OECD 2013). This information is missing for Estonia and Slovenia 
for the years 2004 and 2006. 
The second variable used to approximate the level of labour protection is focused on the 
protection of unemployed individuals, and operationalized as the amount of unemployment 
benefits to which workers are entitled net of taxes (i.e. the net replacement rate [NRR]). The 
NRR is given by the ratio of disposable income of unemployed individuals to their disposable 
income when they are at work (Salomäki and Munzi 1999). This variable can range from 0 
to 1, where higher values denote higher subsidies to the unemployed net of taxes. 
Additionally, we use a third variable to approximate the level of labour protection, namely 
national social expenditure as a proportion of GDP. This variable can also range from 0 to 1, 
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where higher values denote higher levels of labour protection (Hazans 2011b). 7 This 
complements the previous measures by capturing broader aspects of social protection, 
including social expenditure in active labor market programs, tax concessions, age pensions, 
disability schemes, the universality of the health system or housing protection, amongst 
others (Schneider and Enste 2000, Bajada and Schneider 2009). 
Table 2 shows bivariate pairwise correlations between the measures of labour protection and 
the percentage of informal workers. Because these data vary only by country and year, 
country/year observations (n≈95) are used for the calculation of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients (r). As expected, the EPRC index (r=.08), degree of social expenditure (r=.21) 
and generosity of unemployment benefits (r=.48) are all negatively correlated with the 
percentage of informal workers, though the association is not statistically significant at the 
10% level for the EPRC index. However, the 3 measures of labour protection are not very 
strongly correlated. r is .51 for employment protection and unemployment benefits, .37 for 
social expenditure and unemployment benefits, and just .17 for employment protection and 
social expenditure. The latter association is not statistically significant at the 10% level.8 
Our multivariate analyses include the following individual-level control variables: self-
employed status, gender, age, partnership status, parenthood status, whether retired, whether 
a full-time student, education, ethnicity, migrant status, occupational skill level, and 
employment sector. The models include also the following country-level control variables: 
country dummies (pooled model only), and per capita GDP growth. Additionally, all models 
control for study year using dummy variables.9  
 
Table 2: Correlations between key variables 
 EPRC Unemployment 
benefits 
Social 
expenditure 
Unemployment benefits  .39***   
                                                          
7 For details on the multilevel data merged to ESS, see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/data/multilevel/  
8 We tried different methods to combine these indicators of labour protection, including principal component 
analysis and factor analysis. However, results were discouraging. For instance, the Cronbach Alpha statistic 
resulting from linearly combining the measures was only 0.34, way below the acceptable threshold of 0.7. 
9 Means and standard deviations for macro- and micro-level variables for all workers, employees and self-
employed workers in the formal and informal sectors, and t-tests for sector differences are shown in Table A1 
in the Appendix. 
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 (n=90)   
Social expenditure  .17  .32***  
 (n=90) (n=94)  
% workers in the informal sector ˗.08 -.33*** ˗.21** 
 (n=90) (n=94) (n=94) 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Pearson correlation coefficients (sample size in parentheses). One observation 
per country/year. Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
5.1. Pooled probit regression results 
Table 3 presents the results of pooled probit models of the propensity to undertake informal 
work. The estimated effects are expressed as marginal effects, and so they give the predicted 
increase in the probability of a worker doing informal work associated with a 1-unit change 
in the explanatory variables. 
Models (1) to (3) are estimated on the complete sample of workers, which comprises both 
employees and the self-employed. The key explanatory variable in Model (1) is the EPRC 
index. The estimated marginal effect on this variable (ME=−.041, p<.0.05) indicates that a 
1-unit increase in the EPRC index is associated with a 4% reduction in the probability of a 
worker undertaking informal work, ceteris paribus. This effect is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Therefore, employment protection, as measured by the EPRC index, decreases 
the size of the informal sector. Models (2) and (3) are analogous to Model (1) but substitute 
the EPRC index by other indicators of labour protection. Results suggest that neither the 
generosity of unemployment benefits (ME=−.035, p>.1) nor the degree of national social 
expenditure (ME=−.025, p>.1) have a statistically significant impact on the propensity of 
workers to undertake informal work. 
Models (4) to (6) are estimated using the employee subsample, whereas models (7) to (9) are 
estimated using the self-employed subsample. The negative and statistically significant effect 
of the EPRC index on the propensity for workers to be part of the informal sector in model 
(1) emerges also amongst employees in model (4), and is more precisely estimated 
(ME=−.024, p<.01). However, the estimated effect is not statistically different from zero in 
the analogous model for the self-employed, model (7) (ME=.038, p>.1). This suggests that 
employment protection, as measured by the EPRC index, reduces the overall prevalence of 
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informal employment in a country by reducing the propensity for employees to take up 
employment in the informal economy, but does not affect the outcomes of the self-employed. 
Splitting the sample into employees and self-employed workers does not change the 
conclusions drawn about the effects on informal work of the generosity of unemployment 
benefits (models 5 and 8) or national social expenditure (models 6 and 9), for which the 
estimated marginal effects remain statistically insignificant.10 
Altogether, results from pooled probit models suggest that, when measured as the EPRC 
index, employment protection is associated with a lower probability of employees working 
in the informal sector. For other labour protection indicators, we observe no statistically 
significant associations. However, the estimated coefficients on these models may suffer 
from omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. In what follows, we present the 
results of pseudo-panel fixed-effect models which reduce such biases. 
 
                                                          
10 The estimated coefficients on the control variables are for the most part consistent with theory and 
expectations. In most models, informal work is associated with per capita GDP growth, age, self-employment, 
being female, having children, being disabled, living in a rural area, being unpartnered, being retired, being a 
student, having low levels of education, and working in medium or low skilled occupations rather than low 
skilled occupations. There are also important differences in the prevalence of informal work across sectors of 
economic activity. 
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Table 3: Pooled probit model for working in the informal sector, marginal effects 
 All workers Employees Self-employed 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Macro-level variables          
EPRC -.041**   -.024***   .038   
 (-3.12)   (-4.79)   (0.54)   
Unemployment benefit   -.035   -.023   .123  
  (-0.70)   (-0.71)   (1.01)  
Social expenditure   .025   .008   .160 
   (0.14)   (0.11)   (0.46) 
Per capita GDP growth  .197* .158* .175* .128** .107** .115** -.186 -.122 -.131 
 (2.58) (2.21) (2.24) (3.17) (2.72) (2.69) (-1.13) (-0.94) (-0.73) 
Micro-level variables          
Self-employed .380*** .379*** .379***       
 (39.50) (39.63) (39.74)       
Female .018* .018* .018* .010 .010 .010 .012 .012 .012 
 (2.25) (2.25) (2.27) (2.01) (2.01) (2.02) (1.22) (1.25) (1.23) 
Age/100 .050*** .050*** .050*** .025*** .025*** .025*** .062 .061 .061 
 (2.44) (2.41) (2.43) (2.46) (2.43) (2.45) (1.29) (1.29) (1.28) 
Partnered -.012* -.012* -.012* -.006** -.006** -.006** -.016 -.016 -.016 
 (-2.21) (-2.24) (-2.24) (-3.10) (-3.14) (-3.14) (-1.03) (-1.04) (-1.03) 
With children .006 .005 .006 .005*** .005*** .005*** -.012 -.012 -.012 
 (1.86) (1.83) (1.82) (3.53) (3.43) (3.42) (-1.12) (-1.11) (-1.10) 
Disabled .048* .048* .048* .031* .031* .031* -.004 -.004 -.003 
 (2.05) (2.05) (2.05) (2.51) (2.52) (2.52) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.11) 
Lives in a rural area .032*** .032*** .032*** .019*** .019*** .019*** .010 .010 .011 
 (7.11) (7.12) (7.14) (5.32) (5.33) (5.35) (0.67) (0.70) (0.69) 
Student .063*** .064*** .064*** .033*** .034*** .034*** .006 .005 .005 
 (6.83) (6.86) (6.86) (6.83) (6.85) (6.84) (0.44) (0.41) (0.41) 
Retired .047*** .048*** .048*** .031*** .030*** .031*** -.002 -.001 -.001 
 (3.91) (3.91) (3.91) (4.62) (4.56) (4.57) (-0.10) (-0.07) (-0.06) 
Education          
Tertiary (ref.)          
Primary  .044*** .044*** .044*** .020*** .020*** .020*** .094*** .094*** .095*** 
 (7.94) (7.94) (7.87) (8.97) (8.97) (9.02) (7.04) (7.22) (7.55) 
Secondary .019*** .019*** .019*** .006* .006* .006* .076*** .076*** .076*** 
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 (3.48) (3.51) (3.52) (2.58) (2.62) (2.62) (4.71) (4.75) (4.74) 
Occupation skill level          
Low (ref.)          
Medium -.036*** -.036*** -.036*** -.021*** -.022*** -.022*** -.006 -.006 -.006 
 (-8.69) (-8.67) (-8.70) (-11.32) (-11.28) (-11.36) (-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.55) 
High -.096*** -.096*** -.096*** -.013** -.013** -.013** -.288*** -.288*** -.287*** 
 (-4.71) (-4.72) (-4.72) (-2.99) (-2.99) (-2.99) (-14.64) (-14.47) (-14.46) 
Local minority .006 .005 .005 .003 .003 .003 .015 .015 .015 
 (0.62) (0.57) (0.58) (0.67) (0.63) (0.63) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56) 
Immigrant .031* .031* .031* .019* .019* .019* .015 .015 .015 
 (2.31) (2.31) (0.021) (2.28) (2.27) (2.28) (1.61) (1.57) (1.51) 
Economic sector          
Manufacture (ref.)          
Agriculture 0.099*** .099*** .099*** .042*** .042*** .042*** .107*** .107*** .107*** 
 (9.26) (9.29) (9.28) (9.09) (9.05) (9.07) (4.08) (4.10) (4.11) 
Construction .045*** .045*** .045*** .021*** .021*** .021*** .073*** .073*** .073*** 
 (5.12) (5.15) (5.17) (5.32) (5.34) (5.36) (3.34) (3.36) (3.37) 
Transport & trade .013* .012* .013* .004 .004* .004* .038* .038** .039** 
 (2.53) (2.58) (2.60) (1.99) (2.03) (2.04) (2.41) (2.44) (2.46) 
Public admin. -.011 -.011 -.011 -.008 -.008 -.008 -.004 -.004 -.003 
 (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-1.41) (-1.42) (-1.42) (-0.22) (-0.21) (-0.19) 
Survey year          
2004 (ref.)          
2006 -.005 -.003 -.004 -.003 -.002 -.002 .008 .005 .007 
 (-0.66) (-0.47) (-0.56) (-0.90) (-0.63) (-0.79) (0.38) (0.24) (0.38) 
          
          
          
2008 .002 .001 .002 .001 .000 .001 .015 .018 .0153 
 (0.39) (0.22) (0.33) (0.25) (0.05) (0.13) (0.63) (0.73) (0.64) 
2010 -.016** -.015* -.016*** -.011*** -.010** -.011 .007 .005 .003 
 (-2.71) (-2.35) (-3.25) (-3.55) (-2.94) (-3.27) (0.37) (0.30) (0.20) 
2012 -.015* -.010 -.011* -.001 -.004 -.005 -.019 -.023* -.024* 
 (-2.08) (-1.55) (-1.88) (-1.84) (-1.07) (-1.30) (-1.41) (-2.10) (-2.07) 
N (observations) 87,130 90,048 90,048 74,706 77,388 77,388 12,424 12,660 12,660 
Log likelihood -17,805 -17,860 -17,860 -12,916 -12,961 -12,961 -3,828 -3,835 -3,836 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. Control variables include country dummies. t-statistics in parentheses. 
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5.2. Pseudo-panel estimation 
5.2.1. Constructing pseudo-panels 
We use the repeated-cross sections of the ESS to build a pseudo-panel dataset following the 
approached detailed in Deaton (1985). This involves defining cohorts using time-constant 
individual characteristics, and dividing the population into different cohorts with the 
characteristics of a representative cohort member. Longitudinal analysis is then undertaken 
using the cohort as the units of analysis.11 
We construct cohorts based on survey instalment (n=5), country (n=20) and workers’ date of 
birth (n=6: 1946-52, 1953-59, 1960-66, 1967-73, 1974-80, 1981-87). This should result in 
20*5*6=600 observations, from 20*6=120 cohorts, observed 5 times each. However, our 
pseudo-panels consist of fewer than 600 observations. This is because some countries did not 
participate in some ESS instalments,12 or had missing data on labour protection variables, 
and two observations of the oldest cohort were excluded because they were based on fewer 
than 30 individuals (see Deaton 1985). The same process is repeated for the subsamples of 
employees and self-employed workers (although we do not restrict the cohort sizes to be over 
30 individuals for these). 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics on the number of individuals used to construct the 562 
observations from our 120 cohorts. For cohorts comprising all workers (i.e. employees as 
well as self-employed workers) the average number of individuals is 142.4. When 
considering only employees, the mean cohort size is still large, of 122.4. These numbers are 
well over the optimal cohort size of 100 individuals recommended by Verbeek and Nijman 
(1993). For the self-employed, however, the mean cohort size, 22, is very small. Hence, 
results using this subsample are to be interpreted with care. 
 
 
Table 4: Cohort size 
                                                          
11 There is an inherent trade-off between the number and size of cohorts (Deaton 1985, McKenzie 2004). Using 
a small number of cohorts maximizes cohort size, but may lead to inefficient estimation due to larger within-
cohort heterogeneity. Using a large number of cohorts reduces cohort size, but may lead to biased estimation.  
12 Data are missing for Greece (2006, 2012), France (2004, 2012), Czech Republic (2006) and Hungary (2004). 
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Date of birth Observations (cohort) Mean SD Min Max 
All workers 562 (120) 142.4 51.4 31 356 
Employees 562 (120) 122.4 44.3 8 294 
Self-employed 555 (120) 20.2 13.0 1 96 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). 
 
5.2.1. Pseudo-panel fixed-effect regression results 
Table 5 shows the results of pseudo-panel fixed-effect linear regression models of the 
propensity to work in the informal sector.13 As explained before, results from these pseudo-
panel fixed-effect models are superior to results obtained from pooled probit models because 
they account for time-invariant unobserved effects which, if correlated with the explanatory 
and outcome variables, would bias the estimated parameters. These are linear models, and so 
the estimated coefficients give the expected change in the proportion of workers in the 
informal sector within a cohort at a specific point in time associated with a within-cohort 1-
unit over-time increase in the explanatory variables. Since the outcome variable is in fact a 
proportion, the coefficients approximate the within-cohort change in the probability that a 
worker is employed in the informal sector. 
Models (10) to (12) are estimated on the complete sample of workers, which comprises both 
employees and self-employed workers. Unlike for the pooled probit models, all three labour 
protection indicators are significantly related to the probability of individuals working 
informally. The coefficient on the EPRC index (B=−.040, p<.1) indicates that a 1-unit 
increase in the EPRC index is associated with a decrease of 4 percentage points in the 
percentage of workers in the cohort employed in the informal sector, all else being equal. 
The coefficient on unemployment benefits (B=−.149, p<.01) indicates that a 1 percentage-
point increase in the NRR is associated with a decrease of 1.5 percentage points in the 
percentage of workers working informally, ceteris paribus. Similarly, the coefficient on the 
                                                          
13 The models are estimated using Stata routine xtreg with the fe option. Some propose that, when cohort 
sizes differ substantially, better estimation can be achieved using weights given by the square root of the cohort 
size (Devereux 2006, Ziegelhofer 2014). We tested the robustness of our results to this situation using Stata 
user-written subroutine ppreg (Lonkshin et al. 2008), which corrects for measurement error in the observed 
cohort means. The results are similar and are available upon request. Since ppreg cannot handle time 
interactions, we use the xtreg estimates as our main results. 
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degree of social expenditure (B=−.374, p<.01) indicates that a 1 percentage-point increase in 
social expenditure is associated with a 3.7 percentage point decrease in the percentage of 
workers employed in the informal sector, ceteris paribus. 
Models (13) to (15) are estimated using only the employee subsample, whereas models (16) 
to (18) are estimated using only subsample of self-employed workers. Amongst employees, 
the EPRC index in Model 13 (B=−.042, p<.01), the generosity of unemployment benefits in 
Model 14 (B=−.184, p<.01) and the degree of social expenditure in Model 15 (B=−.493, 
p<.01) are all negatively and statistically significantly associated with participation in 
informal work. Once again, there are no statistically significant associations amongst the self-
employed. 
Overall, results from these preferred pseudo-panel specifications point towards similar 
conclusions as those drawn from pooled models: labour protection is associated with a 
decrease in the propensity for employees to undertake informal work. The results are also 
clearer, as all three measures of labour protection legislation have statistically significant 
impacts on the outcome. Since these pseudo-panel models account for cohort-specific 
unobserved effects, their results are more robust than those of the analogous pooled probit 
models. Thus, we take these as our preferred set of results. 
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Table 5: Pseudo-panel linear fixed-effect model for working in the informal sector models, model coefficients 
 All workers Employees Self-employed 
 (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Key macro-level variables          
EPRC -0.040***   -0.042***   -0.031   
 (-3.19)   (-2.98)   (-0.64)   
Unemployment benefit  -0.149***   -0.184***   0.185  
  (-4.13)   (-4.78)   (1.32)  
Social expenditure   -0.374***   -0.493***   0.405 
   (-2.71)   (-3.35)   (0.76) 
N (observations) 538 562 562 538 562 562 531 555 555 
N (cohorts) 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. Control variables as in Table 3 (except for country dummies). t-statistics in 
parentheses. 
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5.2.2. Changes in the effect of labour protection over time 
We now examine whether and how the effects of labour protection policies on informal work 
have evolved over the 2004-2012 observation period. This is enlightening as to the effects of 
the GFC, which started in circa 2008. To do so, we estimate pseudo-panel fixed-effect 
regression models analogous to those in Table 5 which add interactions between survey year 
and labour protection measures. Selected results are presented in Models (19) to (21) in Table 
6. Several interaction effects are statistically significant. These are more easily interpreted by 
looking at the margins reported in Table 7. 
The pattern of results differs markedly across the different indicators of labour protection. 
The EPRC measure has a negative and statistically significant effect on the prevalence of 
informal work in years 2004 and 2006. Such effect becomes smaller in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant in years 2008-2012, coinciding with the emergence and 
establishment of the GFC. The generosity of unemployment benefits however has a 
comparable, statistically significant, negative effect on informal work over the complete 
2004-2012 time period – though this is noticeably stronger in 2004. A similar pattern of 
results emerges for the social expenditure variable, which remains negatively and 
significantly associated with informal work through the observation window. 
Overall, results from this exercise suggest that generous unemployment benefits and high 
levels of social expenditure reduced the prevalence of informal work before and during the 
GFC, whereas the importance of employment protection (as measured by the EPRC) eroded 
over time with the emergence of the GFC.14 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Identifying the specific effect of the GFC as an exogenous shock is beyond the scope of this paper and is 
complicated. For instance, the GFC hit different European countries at different times, which makes it difficult 
to put a starting date on it. Additionally, the GFC hit Europe after the United States, which means that complex 
anticipation effects may be at play. Hence, our results remain only tentative of these relationships. Further 
research on the causal effects of the GFC is warranted. 
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Table 6: Pseudo-panel linear fixed-effect model for working in the informal sector models 
with year*labour protection interactions (all workers), model coefficients 
 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. Control variables as in Table 3 
(except for country dummies). t-statistics in parentheses. 
 (19) (20) (21) 
Main effects    
EPRC -0.043***   
 (-3.30)   
Unemployment benefit   -0.194***  
  (-5.13)  
Social expenditure   -0.388*** 
   (-2.64) 
Survey year    
2004 (ref.)    
2006 -0.066*** -0.077** -0.033 
 (-2.83) (-3.60) (-1.37) 
2008 -0.082*** -0.068** -0.030 
 (-2.74) (-2.67) (-0.85) 
2010 -0.121*** -0.094** -0.049 
 (-3.46) (-2.98) (-1.28) 
2012 -0.134*** -0.097** -0.069 
 (-3.21) (-2.48) (-1.60) 
Interaction effects    
2006 * EPRC 0.020**   
 (2.44)   
2008 * EPRC 0.025***   
 (2.99)   
2010 * EPRC 0.033***   
 (3.65)   
2012 * EPRC 0.040***   
 (4.05)   
2006 * Unemployment benefits  0.096***  
  (3.51)  
2008 * Unemployment benefits  0.062**  
  (2.47)  
2010 * Unemployment benefits  0.076***  
  (2.85)  
2012 * Unemployment benefits  0.071***  
  (2.70)  
2006 * Social expenditure   0.040 
   (0.39) 
2008 * Social expenditure   -0.013 
   (-0.12) 
2010 * Social expenditure   -0.020 
   (-0.18) 
2012 * Social expenditure   0.030 
   (0.28) 
N (observations) 538 562 562 
N (cohorts) 120 120 120 
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Table 7: Impact of labour protection on informal work over time (all workers), margins 
Year EPRC Unemployment benefits 
Social 
expenditure 
2004 -.043*** -.194*** -.388*** 
 (-3.30) (-5.13) (-2.64) 
2006 -.023* -.097** -.349** 
 (-1.75) (-2.38) (-2.19) 
2008 -.018 -.132*** -.401** 
 (-1.21) (-3.33) (-2.45) 
2010 -.001 -.117*** -.408** 
 (-.64) (-2.93) (-2.45) 
2012 -.000 -.122*** -.358** 
 (-.16) (-3.10) (-2.37) 
Notes: Based on models 19, 10 & 21 in Table 6. ESS data (2004-2012). Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, 
*** = .01. t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
5.2.3. Regional heterogeneity in the effects of labour protection 
Finally, we explore regional differences in how different labour protection measures affect 
rates of informal work. To do so, we first construct dummy variables dividing countries into 
four geographical regions: Eastern Europe (Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia), Western Europe (Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, France, United 
Kingdom, Ireland and The Netherlands), Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden) and Southern Europe (Greece, Spain and Portugal). We then interact these dummy 
variables with the measures of labour protection, and add the latter to models analogous to 
those presented in Table 5. The new models, models (22) to (24), are shown in Table 8. 
Because regions do not change within cohorts, these models do not contain main effects. 
The analyses reveal insightful regional differences in the effects of different labour protection 
measures on informal employment. In Southern European countries both employment 
protection (B=−.044, p<.01) and unemployment benefits (B=−.455, p<.01) significantly 
reduce informal work. For countries in Western Europe both unemployment benefits 
(B=−.229, p<.01) and social expenditure (B=−.813, p<.01) reduce the prevalence of informal 
work. Amongst countries in Northern Europe, only social expenditure (B=−.402, p<.1) 
significantly reduces informal work. In Eastern Europe, none of the labour protection 
measures has significant effects on informal work. 
Altogether, these results suggest that labour protection measures do not have uniform effects 
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across European regions, and so different policy levers may work best in reducing informal 
work in different areas. 
 
Table 8: Pseudo-panel linear fixed-effect model for working in the informal sector with 
region * labour protection interactions (all workers), model coefficients 
 (22) (23) (24) 
Eastern Europe * EPRC 0.000   
 (0.00)   
Western Europe * EPRC -0.090   
 (-1.62)   
Northern Europe * EPRC -0.088   
 (-1.39)   
Southern Europe * EPRC -0.044***   
 (-3.01)   
Eastern Europe * Unemployment benefits  -0.077  
  (-1.22)  
Western Europe * Unemployment benefits  -0.229***  
  (-3.88)  
Northern Europe * Unemployment benefits  -0.046  
  (-0.61)  
Southern Europe * Unemployment benefits  -0.455***  
  (-3.41)  
Eastern Europe * Social expenditure   0.171 
   (0.85) 
Western Europe * Social expenditure   -0.813*** 
   (-4.76) 
Northern Europe * Social expenditure   -0.402* 
   (-1.72) 
Southern Europe * Social expenditure   -0.087 
   (-0.39) 
N (observations) 538 562 562 
N (cohorts) 120 120 120 
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Significance levels: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. Control variables as in Table 3 
(except for country dummies). t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
5. Discussion  
Several mechanisms may be responsible for the observed negative relationship between 
labour protection legislation and informality. One channel through which this might emerge 
is through shifting workers’ perceptions of job security (Hazans 2011a). From the worker’s 
perspective, labour protection legislation and generous unemployment benefits incentivize 
the take up of formal employment (Perry et al. 2007). From the firm’s perspective, labour 
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protection legislation incurs high financial and administrative costs. However, when 
enforcement of labour protection policies is reasonably strict, employers have incentives to 
employ workers formally as not to face penalties. These results thus support the findings in 
Hazans (2011a), who found that labour protection legislation was associated with lower rates 
of informal dependent employment in European countries in the 2004-2009 period, and 
contrast with those from Fialová (2010), who reports a positive association between labour 
protection legislation and informal work (though, as explained earlier, she considers all 
temporary/casual workers to be informal workers). 
One reason why our results are preferable to those emerging in earlier studies is that both 
Hazans (2011a) and Fialova (2010) aggregate country-level longitudinal data into one 
observation per country and year and fit country-level fixed-effect panel regression models. 
This strategy is clearly inferior to our pseudo-panel models: (i) the number of country-year 
observations in the models and the resulting statistical power is smaller, which might give 
rise to Type-II estimation errors (i.e. failure to reject a false null hypothesis); (ii) their 
approach cannot account for compositional differences in individual-level characteristics 
across countries (see e.g. Duncan et al. 1998); and (iii) interpretation of this sort of models 
might result in ‘ecological fallacies’ (i.e. inferences about individual-level behaviour drawn 
from mean analyses) (Freedman 2002). 
We show how the conclusions drawn from our preferred pseudo-panel fixed-effect models 
are different to those drawn from the more simple pooled cross-sectional models. Results 
from pseudo-panel models reveal much stronger and statistically significant associations than 
pooled cross-sectional models, suggesting that any similar studies using cross-sectional data 
and methods are likely to underestimate the negative labour protection effect on informal 
work. Furthermore, an inspection of the cohort-specific residuals reveals interesting patterns. 
The correlation between such residuals and labour protection measures is generally weak and 
positive, and their correlation with informal work is large and positive: cohorts exposed to 
high degrees of labour protection tend to have unobserved traits that are strongly associated 
with high levels of informal work. As a result, when the unobserved effects remain 
unaccounted for in the pooled models, they partly suppress the ‘true’ effects of labour 
protection on informal work. 
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Beyond methodological improvements, our results also provide new insights. First, our 
analyses cover a longer time frame than previous studies. While Hazans (2011a) and Fialová 
(2010) examine the 2004-2009 and 2003-2007 periods respectively, our analyses extends the 
observation window to the 2004-2012 period, thus engulfing the emergence and 
establishment of the GFC. Concerning this, we find that the inhibiting effect of employment 
protection on informality disappears in the GFC years, while the effects of unemployment 
benefits and social expenditure remain. A possible explanation is that enforcement of labour 
protection legislation during economic recession is lax, with court decisions leaning towards 
the firm, which could reduce the impact of such legislation. 
Second, we compare the effects of labour protection on informal work across European 
regions. We find that regardless of the measure considered, when labour protection has a 
significant effect on the prevalence of informal work, this is always negative. Yet, our results 
also suggest that different labour protection measures ‘work’ differently across European 
regions. Without further inquiry, it is difficult to ascertain the reasons why this might be the 
case. One possibility is that this is related to the prevailing regional welfare model: the Nordic 
model characterised by low EPRC and high unemployment benefits, the Continental model 
with high EPRC and high unemployment benefits, the Mediterranean model with high EPRC 
and low unemployment benefits, and the Anglo-Saxon model with low EPRC and high 
unemployment benefits (Sapir 2006). Another possibility is that the effectiveness of different 
labour protection policies varies with the regional prevalence of informal work: 10% in 
Northern Europe, 14% in Eastern Europe, 18% in Western Europe and 29% in Southern 
Europe. More measures ‘work’ in contexts in which informal employment is more 
widespread. Further research into these divergences is warranted. 
Third, we show that employees and self-employed workers react differently to labour 
protection policies. These have strong negative effect on the propensity for employees to 
work in formal jobs, but no apparent effect amongst the self-employed. This was to be 
expected, as most of the benefits of labour protection legislation – as measured here – do not 
extend to the self-employed (e.g. severance payments, unemployment benefits or collective 
dismissal regulation). Thus, this patterning of results constitutes further evidence of the 
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validity of our findings.15 
Our study is nevertheless not without shortcomings. Despite the fact that our pseudo-panel 
models are superior to the analytical techniques used in previous studies, the reported 
estimates cannot be taken as ‘causal effects’. Both unobserved heterogeneity and reverse 
causation might still operate, and so future research could attempt to move towards causal 
analysis by correcting these. We see two possible routes for methodological refinement in 
this regard, both of which are subject to data availability. Firstly, using actual panel data in 
which the same individuals are followed over time instead of pseudo-panel data in which the 
same cohorts are followed over time will attenuate any bias due to unobserved factors jointly 
related to labour protection legislation and informality. While pseudo-panel estimation has 
certain advantages over traditional panel designs (e.g. fewer issues due to attrition, 
measurement error or panel conditioning), mean-based pseudo-panel models do not provide 
information on intra-cohort effects, suffer from difficult-to-correct systematic 
heteroskedascity, and in some cases do not capture unobserved heterogeneity as 
appropriately as individual-level panel regression models (Fields and Viollaz 2013, Gardes 
et al. 2005). Second, reverse causality remains a possible source of endogeneity to the extent 
that the size of the informal sector influences the adoption of labour protection policies. 
Correcting for this is harder and requires the availability of an instrument or naturally-
emerging experiment to be used in simultaneous-equation or instrumental-variable 
estimation (Wooldridge 2010).16 Nevertheless, applications of such methods to pseudo-panel 
data are still in their infancy. 
There are also data-driven limitations as to how informal work and labour protection are 
operationalized in this and other empirical studies. Survey reports of whether workers have 
a legal contract might suffer from social desirability bias (Tourangeau and Yan 2007) if 
                                                          
15 Additionally, there are marked differences in the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of explanatory 
variables in the models for employees and self-employed workers. In fact, relatively few variables have 
statistically significant impacts on the propensity to work in the informal sector for the self-employed, which 
may be attributable to the large heterogeneity in employment circumstances amongst self-employed workers, 
or to selection into self-employment (Lunn and Steen 2005). Some of these differences might also be related to 
the measure of informal self-employment and the relatively small sample sizes for self-employed workers 
(particularly in pseudo-panel models). 
16 In our context, such instrument should be a factor that is moderately-to-strongly correlated with national 
investments in labour protection legislation, and not independently associated with informality (for example, 
whether a country is governed by a left- or right-wing party). 
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workers who do not have a contract are reluctant to admit it due to fears of being exposed or 
feelings of shame. This means that the observed rate of informal employment may be a lower-
bound estimate of the true rate of informal employment. Relatedly, it is possible that some 
workers (for example the lowly educated and those who have been in their jobs for a long 
time) cannot recall whether they have a legal contract or are unaware of it. These issues likely 
introduce statistical ‘noise’ in the analysis, resulting in larger standard errors and more 
imprecise estimation of the effects of interest. Finally, despite being grounded in theory and 
previous empirical work, labour protection measures are imperfect, as they cannot fully 
capture the complexity and idiosyncrasies in legislation and enforcement across countries 
(Bertola et al. 2000). Better data and data collection methods would help in this regard. 
Our research findings point towards promising avenues for future research. New studies 
should focus on empirically establishing the micro-level mechanisms that connect labour 
protection policies to worker and employer decisions. In this paper, we have taken a 
predominantly supply-side approach. From this perspective, studies should examine the 
reasons why different sorts of workers work in the formal and informal sectors, paying 
attention to the extent to which these decisions are voluntary or involuntary, and how they 
differ across labour protection regimes. Studies of which workers are more or less satisfied 
in different segments of the economy might also shed light over these issues. From a demand 
perspective, it is important to examine how firms react and adjust to changes in labour 
protection legislation in either direction. Testing this premise requires firm-level data. 
Finally, our analytical approach could be used to examine the relationships between labour 
protection and informal work in developing countries, on which systematic cross-national 
studies are particularly lacking (Maloney 1999, 2004). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed the associations between labour protection and informal work 
in European countries. We contribute to the scant existing literature by using a powerful 
dataset consisting of 5 cross-sections of cross-national European data augmented with 
external macro-level variables. Our analytical strategy – pseudo-panel fixed-effect regression 
models – controls for unobserved heterogeneity and compositional differences in the 
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characteristics of workers across countries more effectively than the specifications used in 
previous research. Key findings indicate that labour protection, such as stricter employment 
protection regulation, more generous unemployment benefits or greater levels of social 
expenditure, is associated with a reduction in the propensity for individuals to do informal 
work.  
Our results have significant policy implications. In the last decade, European countries have 
implemented policies promoting labour market flexibility (such as reducing the generosity 
of unemployment benefit schemes and the regulation of employment protection) to become 
more competitive in the global economy (Turrini et al. 2014). This has proven effective in 
managing unemployment (Martin 2014). Yet, our findings suggest that these policies have 
the unintended consequence of increasing the size of the informal sector, which may offset 
(or partially offset) their alleged benefits. In this way, our analyses second Blanchard’s claims 
that it is essential: 
 
“to protect workers, not jobs […] providing unemployment insurance, generous 
in level, but conditional on the willingness of the unemployment to train for and 
accept jobs if available […] employment protection, but in the form of financial 
costs to firms to make them internalize the social costs of unemployment, including 
unemployment insurance”  (Blanchard 2006, p.45) 
 
Of course, the desirability to invest in labour protection legislation depends also on how it 
affects other labour market outcomes. The tension between managing unemployment and 
informal work rates is not new (see Kucera and Roncolato 2008). For example, conventional 
wisdom dictates that labour protection may increase unemployment. This has been confirmed 
in empirical research (Bajada and Schneider 2009). Yet, other commentators argue that the 
impact of labour protection on unemployment depends on the degree to which the extra costs 
of labour protection are shifted onto employees through wage adjustment (Nickell 1997, 
p.66.). Further research taking a broader look at the pros and cons of labour protection 
policies is needed in this regard. 
In contemporary political and media discourses the adoption of (stricter) legislation to protect 
workers is criticized by many on the grounds that such policies inevitably lead to increasing 
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informal employment. Our results stand in direct contrast to this proposition and provide 
important evidence that should be used to inform and contextualize these debates.  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Sample means and standard deviations and t-tests  
 All workers  Employees  Self-employed 
 Total Formal Informal Diff. (2&3)  Formal Informal 
Diff. 
(5&6)  Formal Informal 
Diff. 
(8&9) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
Macro-level variables             
EPRC 2.541 2.547 2.515 0.032***  2.547 2.422 0.126***  2.546 2.562 -0.016 
 (0.469) (0.457) (0.524)   (0.456) (0.565)   (0.465) (0.496)  
Unemployment benefit 0.640 0.647 0.612 0.035***  0.647 0.593 0.054***  0.644 0.621 0.023*** 
 (0.161) (0.155) (0.184)   (0.155) (0.204)   (0.164) (0.172)  
Social expenditure 0.232 0.234 0.228 0.006***  0.234 0.221 0.013***  0.236 0.231 0.006*** 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.037)   (0.042) (0.036)   (0.041) (0.038)  
Per capita GDP growth  0.038 0.039 0.035 0.004***  0.039 0.034 0.005***  0.036 0.036 0.001 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)   (0.035) (0.038)   (0.036) (0.036)  
Micro-level variables             
Self-employed 0.139 0.033 0.665 -0.632***         
Female 0.478 0.496 0.395 0.102***  0.502 0.513 -0.010  0.313 0.335 -0.022** 
Age 42.29 41.81 44.64 -2.828***  41.63 40.98 0.645***  47.17 46.47 0.694*** 
 (12.15) (11.88) (13.12)   (11.84) (14.52)   (11.93) (11.94)  
Partnered 0.678 0.677 0.683 -0.006  0.675 0.574 0.101***  0.753 0.738 0.015 
With children 0.498 0.499 0.498  0.001   0.498 0.429  0.070***  0.504 0.533 -0.028** 
Disabled 0.004 0.004 0.005  -0.000   0.004 0.006  -0.001  0.005 0.004 0.001 
Lives in a rural area 0.073 0.062 0.132 -0.070***  0.061 0.119 -0.057***  0.068 0.138 -0.070*** 
Student 0.036 0.036 0.037  -0.001  0.037 0.081 -0.045***  0.024 0.015 0.010*** 
Retired  0.016 0.014 0.032 -0.018***  0.013 0.034 -0.021***  0.040 0.031 0.009** 
Education             
Primary 0.059 0.046 0.126 -0.079***  0.047 0.140 -0.093***  0.030 0.119 -0.089*** 
Secondary 0.618 0.614 0.642 -0.028***  0.623 0.635  -0.012*  0.361 0.646 -0.284*** 
Tertiary 0.319 0.338 0.230 0.108***  0.329 0.223 0.106***  0.604 0.233 0.371*** 
Occupation skill level             
Low 0.452 0.425 0.585 -0.160***  0.437 0.637 -0.200***  0.081 0.559 -0.478*** 
34 
 
Medium 0.266 0.286 0.172 0.114***  0.294 0.190 0.104***  0.046 0.163 -0.117*** 
High 0.280 0.289 0.243 0.046***  0.269 0.172 0.096***  0.873 0.278 0.595*** 
Local minority 0.018 0.019 0.018  0.001  0.019 0.017  0.002  0.017 0.019  -0.002 
Immigrant 0.050 0.050 0.055 -0.005***  0.050 0.088 -0.038***  0.043 0.038  0.005 
Employment sector             
Agriculture 0.045 0.026 0.140 -0.114***  0.026 0.069 -0.044***  0.025 0.175 -0.150*** 
Manufacturing 0.159 0.173 0.095 0.078***  0.176 0.122 0.054***  0.099 0.082 0.017*** 
Construction 0.297 0.265 0.452 -0.186***  0.263 0.443 -0.179***  0.325 0.456 -0.131*** 
Transport and trade 0.188 0.190 0.181 0.009**  0.185 0.150 0.035***  0.325 0.197 0.128*** 
Public services 0.309 0.346 0.132 0.214***  0.350 0.216 0.134***  0.225 0.090 0.136*** 
Observations 93,948  77,982 15,966   75,442 5,355   2,540 10,611  
Notes: ESS data (2004-2012). Standard deviations in parentheses. Significance levels for t-tests of mean differences: * = .1, ** = .05, *** = .01. 
 
